What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not , Notas de estudo de Políticas Públicas

Baixe What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not e outras Notas de estudo em PDF para Políticas Públicas, somente na Docsity! r (jJvW-i? j cUMM'i fhe Democratic Moment tant factor-the largely . is certainly not meant analogous situa~ion. Yet spectrum seem to agree, political, economic, and ~rious social or economic : terrible for Americans, it ~s of democracy worldwide. st be to repair the fabric of WOUn.... Thus the highest I-nh our own democratic order. That is not to advocate, however, that America "come home" and turn its back on its international responsibilities as the world's leading democracy. It is true that the energies and resources of the United States are not unlimited, but if properly directed, they are sufficient for both its domestic and international needs. There is no real conflict between improving democracy at home and supporting its spread and consolidation abroad. Just as the model provided by a healthy United States enhances the aspiration for democracy elsewhere, so the progress of the struggle for democracy around the world can give Americans renewed appreciation of the principles on which our country was founded and on which its future success depends. ,- NOTES I. Daniel P. Moynihan, 'The American Experiment," The Public Interest 41 (Fall 1975), 6. 2. Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History," The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 3.18. 3. Miklos Haraszti, "A Choice Between Resolution and Emotion," East European Reporter, Spring.Summer 1990, 76. 4. See Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Death of the Third Way," The National Interest 20 (Summer 1990), 25.37. 5. Milan Simecka, "The Restoration of Freedom," Journal of Democracy I (Summer 1990): 3.12. 6. Washington Post, 31 March 1991, A23. 7. Interview with Vaclav Klaus, NFF Update, Winter 1991, 2. 8. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 2:230. 9. Ken Jowitt, "The New World Disorder," .loumal of Democracy 2 (Winter 1991): II. 20. 10. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," Jou/'/wl of Delll~cracy 2 (Spring 1991): 27. .. 3. WHAT DEMOCRACY IS . AND IS NOT Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn KarZ Philippe C. Schmitter is professor of political science and director of the Center for European Studies at Stanford University. Terry Lynn Karl is associate professor of political science and director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the same institution, The original, longer version of this essay was written at the request of the United States Agency for International Development, which is not responsible for its content. For some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a'debased currency in the political marketplace. Politicians with, a .wide,range of convictions and practices strove to appropriate the label and:.attach it to their actions. Scholars, conversely, hesitated to use it-without, adding qualifying adjectives-because of the ambiguity that surrgunds i,it..The distinguished American political theorist" Robert D~.L!eventried to introduce a new term, "polyarchy," in its stead in the (vain), hope of gaining a greater measure of conceptual precision.)Butrfor':jbetter or worse, we are "stuck" with democracy as the catchwor,dof contemporary political discourse. It is the word that resonates in people's minds and springs from their lips as they struggle for freedom and a ~tter,.way of life; it, is the word whose meaning we must discern if it is to be/.of. any use in guiding political analysis and practice. ih~~~f{,;:;\ The wave, of transitions away from autocratic rote. tha!~b,eganjwith Portugal's "Revolution of the Carnations" in 1974 and §~msj;,to have crested with the collapse of communist regimes across .~astern Europe in 1989 has produced a welcome convergence towards,a"i,common definition of democracy.I Everywhere there has been al".1;si!ent abandonment of dlfbiou~adjectives like "popular," "guided'!i~ibourgeois;!' and "formal" to modify "democracy." At the same time..'!4\.;remarkable consensus has emerged concerning the minimal conditions:::.that,polities must meet in order to merit the prestigious appellation of !'democrati<;;~ Moreover, a number of international organizations now monitor how well' r 40 What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not these standards are met; indeed, some countries even consider them when formulating foreign policy.2 What Democracy Is Let us begin by broadly defining democracy and the generic concepts that distinguish it as a unique system for organizing relations between rulers and the ruled. We will then briefly review procedures, the rules and arrangements that are needed if democracy is to endure. Finally, we will discuss two operative principles that make democracy work. They are not expressly included among the generic concepts or formal procedures, but the prospect for democracy is grim if their underlying conditioning effects are not present. . One of the major themes of this essay is that democracy does not consist of a single unique set of institutions. There are. many types of democracy, and their diverse practices produce a similarly varied set of effects. The specific form democracy takes is contingent upon a country's socioeconomic conditions as welI as its entrenched state structures and policy practices. Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens. acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their electedrepresentatives.3 A regime orr~ystem of governance is an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions. To work properly, the ensemble must be institutionalized-that is to say, the various patterns must be habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, if not all, actors. Increasingly, the preferred mechanism of institutionalization is a written body of laws undergirded by a written constitution, though many enduring political norms can have an informal,prudential, or traditional basiS.4 For the sake of economy and comparison, these forms, characteristics, and rules are usually bundled together and given a generic label. Democratic is one; others are autocratic, authoritarian, despotic, dictatorial, tyrannical, totalitarian, absolutist, traditional, monarchic, oligarchic, plutocratic, aristocratic, and sultanistic.5Each of these regime forms may in turn be broken down into subtypes. Like all regimes, democracies depend upon the presence of ~, persons who occupy specialized authority roles and can give legitimate commands to others. What distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions. :~. q. ~; ,,' ." "' .. Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl The public realm encompasses the making of collective nonns and choices that are binding on the society and backed by state coercion. Its content can vary a great deal across democracies, depending upon preexisting distinctions between the public and the private, state and society, legitimate coercion and voluntary exchange, and collective needs, and individual preferences. The liberal conception. of democracy advocates circumscribing the public realm as narrowly as possible, while the socialist or social-democratic approach would extend that realm through regulation, subsidization, and, in some cases, .collective ownership of property. Neither is intrinsically more democratic than the other-just differently democratic. This implies that measures aimed at "developing the,private sector" are no more democratic tijan those aimed>at "developing the public sector." Both, if carried to extremes, could undennine the practice of democracy, the former by destroying the basis for satisfying collective needs and exercising legitimate authority; the latter by destroying the basis for satisfying individual preferences and controlling illegitimate government actions. Differences of opinion over the optimal mix of the two provide much of the substantive content of political conflict within established democracies. Citizens are the most distinctive element in democracies. All regimes have rulers and a public realm, but only to the extent that they are. .I' democratic do they have citizens. Historically, severe restrictions on citizenship were imposed in most emerging or partial democracies according to criteria of age, gender, class, race, literacy, property ownership, tax-paying status, and so on. Only a small part of the total population was eligible to vote or run for office. Only restricted social categories were allowed to form, join, or support political associations. After protracted struggle-in some cases involving violent domestic upheaval or international war-most of these restrictions were lifted. Today, the criteria for inclusion are fairly standard. All native-born adults are eligible, although somewhat higher age limits may still be imposed upon candidates for certain offices. Unlike the early American and European democracies of the nineteenth century, none of the recent democracies in southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, or Eastern Europe has even attempted to impose fonnal restrictions on the franchise or eligibility to office. When it comes to informal restrictions 011 the effective exercise of citizenship rights, however, the story can ,be quite different. This explains the central importance (discussed below) of procedures. Competition has not always been considered an es~ential defining condition of democracy. "Classic" democracies presumed decision making based on direct participation leading to consensus. The assembled citizenry was expected to agree on a com~rse of action after listening to the alternatives and weighing their respective merits and demerits. A tradition of hostility to "faction," and "particular interests" 41 46 What Democracy Is... . and Is Not this condition for granted since they referred to formally sovereign nation-states. However, with the development of blocs, altiances, spheres of influence, and a variety of “neocolonial” arrangements, the question of autonomy has been a salient one. Is a system really democratic if its elected officials are unable to make binding decisions without the approval of actors outside their territorial domain? This is significant even if the outsiders are themselves democratically constituted and if the insiders are relatívely free to alter or even end the encompassing arrangement (as in Puerto Rico), but it becomes especially critical if neither condition obtains (as in the Baltic states). Principles that Make Democracy Feasible Lists of component processes and procedural norms help us to specify what democracy is, but they do not tell us much about how it actually functions. The simplest answer is “by the consent of the people”; the more complex one is “by the contingent consent of politicians acting under conditions of bounded uncertainty.” In a democracy, representatives must at least informally agree that those who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not use their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or exerting influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunity to keep competing for power and place, momentary losers will respect the winners” right to make binding decisions. Citizens are expected to obey the decisions ensuing from such a process of competition, provided its outcome remains contingent upon their collective preferences as expressed through fair and regular elections or open and repeated negotiations. The challenge is not so much to find a set of goals that command widespread consensus as to find a set of rules that embody contingent consent. The precise shape of this “democratic bargain,” to use Dahl's expression," can vary a good deal from society to society. It depends on social cleavages and such subjective factors as mutual trust, the standard of faimess, and the willingness to compromise. It may even be compatible with a great deal of dissensus on substantive policy issues. All democracies involve a degree of uncertainty about who will be elected and what policies they will pursue. Even-in those polities where one party persists in winning elections or one policy is consistently implemented, the possibility of change through independent collective action still exists, as in Italy, Japan, and the Scandinavian social democracies. If it does not, the system is not democratic, as in Mexico, Senegal, or Indonesia. But the uncertainty embedded in the core of all democracies is bounded. Not just any actor can get into the competition and raise any issue he or she pleases—there are previously established rules that must Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 47 be respected. Not just any policy can be adopted —there are conditions that must be met. Democracy institutionalizes “normal,” limited political uncertainty. These boundaries vary from country to country. Constitutional guarantees of property, privacy, expression, and other rights are a part of this, but the most effective boundaries are generated by competition among interest groups and cooperation within civil society. Whatever the rhetoric (and some polities appear to offer their citizens more dramatic alternatives than others), once the rules of contingent consent have been agreed upon, the actual variation is likely to stay within a predictable and generally accepted range. This emphasis on operative guidelines contrasts with a highly persistent, but misleading theme in recent literature on democracy—namely, the emphasis upon “civic culture.” The principles we have suggested here rest on rules of prudence, not on deeply ingrained habits of tolerance, moderation, mutual respect, fair play, readiness to compromise, or trust in public authorities. Waiting for such habits to sink deep and lasting roots implies a very slow process of regime consolidation—one that takes generations—and it would probably condemn most contemporary experiences ex Aypothesi to failure. Our assertion is that contingent consent and bounded uncertainty can emerge from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious actors and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of a civic culture are better thought of as a product and not a producer of democracy. How Democracies Differ Several concepts have been deliberately excluded from our generic definition of democracy, despite the fact that they have been frequently associated with it in both everyday practice and scholarly work. They are, nevertheless, especially important when it comes to distinguishing subtypes of democracy. Since no single set of actual institutions, practices, or values embodies democracy, polities moving away from authoritarian rule can mix different components to produce different democracies. It is important to recognize that these do not define points along a single continuum of improving performance, but a matrix of potential combinations that are differently democratic. 1) Consensus: All citizens may not agree on the substantive goals of political action or on the role of the state (although if they did, it would certainly make govemning democracies much easier). 2) Participation: All citizens may not take an active and equal part in politics, although it must be legally possible for them to do so. 3) Access: Rulers may not weigh equally the preferences of all who come before them, although citizenship implies that individuals and groups should have an equal opportunity to express their preferences if they choose to do so. 48 What Democracy Is. . . and Is Not 4) Responsiveness: Rulers may not always follow the course of action preferred by the citizenry. But when they deviate from such a policy, say on grounds of "reason of state" or "overriding national interest," they must ultimately be held accountable for their actions through regular and fair processes. 5) Majority rule: Positions may not be allocated or rules may not be decided solely on the basis of assembling the most votes, although deviations from this principle usually must be explicitly defended and previously approved. 6) Parliamentary sovereignty: The legislature may not be the only body that can make rules or even the one with final authority in deciding which laws are binding, although where executive, judicial, or other public bodies make that ultimate choice, they too must be accountable for their actions. 7) Party government: Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and disciplined in their activities by well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties, although where they are not, it may prove more difficult to form an effective government. 8) Pluralism: The political process may not be based on a multiplicity of overlapping, voluntaristic, and autonomous private groups. However, where there are monopolies of representation, hierarchies of association, and obligatory memberships, it is likely that the interests involved will be more closely linked to the state and the separation between the public and private spheres of action will be much less distinct. 9) Federalism: The territorial division of authority may not involve multiple levels and local autonomies, least of all ones enshrined in a constitutional document, although some dispersal of power across territorial and/or functional units is characteristic of all democracies. 10) Presidentialism: The chief executive officer may hot be a single person and he or she may not be directly elected by the citizenry as a whole, although some concentration of authority is present in all democracies, even if it is exercised collectively and only held indirectly accountable to the electorate. 11) Checks and Balances: It is not necessary that the different branches of government be systematically pitted against one another, although governments by assembly, by executive concentration, by judicial command, or even by dictatorial fiat (as in time of war) must be ultimately accountable to the citizenry as a whole. While each of the above has been named as an essential component of democracy, they should instead be seen either as indicators of this or that type of democracy, or else as useful standards for evaluating the performance of particular regimes. To include them as part of the generic definition of democracy itself would be to mistake the American polity for the universal model of democratic governance. Indeed, the parliamentary, consociational, unitary, corporatist, and concentrated Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl '. 49 arrangements of continental Europe may have some unique virtues for guiding polities through the uncertain transition from autocratic to democratic rule.12 What Democracy Is Not We have attempted to convey the general meaning of modem democracy without identifying it with some particular set of rules and institutions or restricting it to some specific culture or level of development. We have also argued that it cannot be reduced to the regular holding of elections or equated with a particular notion of the role of the state, but we have not said much more about what democracy is not or about what democracy may not be capable of producing. There is an understandable temptation to load too many expectations on this concept and to imagine that by attaining democracy, a society will have resolved all of its political, social, economic, administrative, and cultural problems. Unfortunately, "all good things do not necessarily go together." First, democracies are not necessarily more efficient economically than other forms of government. Their rates of aggregate growth, savings, and investment may be no better than those of nondemocracies. This is especially likely during the transition, when propertied. groups and administrative elites may respond to real or imagined threats to the "rights" they enjoyed under authoritarian rule by initi~ting capital flight, disinvestment, or sabotage. In time, depending upon the" type of democracy, benevolent. long-term effects upon income distribution, aggregate demand,education, productivity, and creativity may eventually combine to improve economic and social performance, but it is certainly too much to expect that these improvements will occur immediately-mucQ. less that they will be defining characteristics of democratization. Second, democracies are not necessarily I more efficient administratively. Their capacity to make decisions may even be, slower than that of the regimes they replace, if only because more actors must be consulted. The costs of getting things done may be higher, if only because "payoffs" have ,to be made to a wider and more resoun;eful set of clients (although one should never underestimate the degree of corruption to be found within autocracies). Popular satisfaction with.the new democratic gqvernment's performance may not even seem greater, if only because necessary co'mpromises often please no one completely, and because the losers are free to complain. , Third, democracies a~enot likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable, or governable than the autocracies they replace. This is partly a byproduct of democratic freedom of expression, but it is also a reflection of the likelihood of continuing disagreement over new rules and /' 50 What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not institutions. These products of imposition or compromise are often initially quite ambiguous in nature and uncertain in effect until actors have learned how to use them. What is more, they come in the aftermath of serious struggles motivated by high ideals. Groups and individuals with recently acquired autonomy will test certain rules, protest against the actions of certain institutions, and insist on renegotiating their part of the bargain. Thus the presence of antisystem parties should be neither surprising nor seen as a failure of democratic consolidation. What counts is whether such parties are willing, however reluctantly, to play by the general rules of bounded uncertainty and contingent consent. Governability is a challenge for all regimes, not just democratic ones. Given the political exhaustion and loss of legitimacy that have befallen autocracies from sultanistic Paraguay to totalitarian Albania, it may seem that only democracies can now be expected to govern effectively and legitimately. Experience has shown, however, that democracies too can lose the ability to govern. Mass publics can become disenchanted with their performance. Even more threatening. is the temptation for leaders to fiddle with procedures and ultimately undermine the principles of contingent consent and bounded uncertainty. Perhaps the most critical moment comes once the politicians begin to settle into the more predictable roles and relations of a consolidated democracy. Many will find their expectations frustrated; some will discover that the new rules of competition put them at a disadvantage; a few may even feel that their vital interests are threatened by popular majorities. Finally, democracies will have more open societies and polities than the autocracies they replace, but not necessarily more open economies. Many of today's most successful and well-established democracies have historically resorted to protectionism and closed borders, and have relied extensively upon public institutions to promote economic development. While the long-term compatibility between democracy and capitalism does not seem to be in doubt, despite their continuous tension, it is not clear whether the promotion of such liberal economic goals as the right of individuals to own property and retain profits, the clearing function of markets, the private settlement of disputes, the freedom to produce without government regulation, or the privatization of state-o~ned enterprises necessarily furthers the consolidation of democracy. After all, democracies do need to levy taxes and regulate certain transactions, especially where private monopolies and oligopolies exist. Citizens or their representatives may decide that it is desirable to protect the rights "...democracies will have more open societies and polities than the autocracies they replace, but not necessarily more open economies." Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl 51 of collectivities from encroachment by individuals, especially propertied ones, and they may choose to set aside certain forms of property for public or cooperative ownership. In short, notions of economic liberty that are currently put forward in neoliberal economic models are not synonymous with political freedom-and may even impede it. Democratization'will not necessarily bring in its wake economic- ] growth, social peace, administrative, efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or "the end of ideology." Least of all will it bring about "the end of history." No doubt some of these qualities could make the consolidation of democracy easier, but they are neither prerequisites for it nor immediate products of it. Instead, what we should be hoping for is the emergence of political institutions that can peacefully compete to form governments and influence public policy, that can channel social and economic conflicts through regular procedures, and that have sufficient linkages to civil society to represent their constituencies and commit them to collective courses of action. Some types of democracies, especially in developing countries, have been unable to fulfill this promise, perhaps due to the circumstances of their transition from authoritarian rule.13The democratic wager is that such a regime, once established, will not only persist by reproducing itself within its initial confining conditions, but will eventually expand beyond them.14Unlike J authoritarian regimes, democracies have the capacity to modify their rules and institutions'consensually in response to changing circumstances. They may not immediately produce all the goods mentioned above, but they stand a better chance of eventually doing so than do autocracies. NOTES I. For a comparative analysis of the recent regime changes in southern Europe and Latin America, see Guillenno O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). For another compilation that adopts a more structural approach see Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democrac;y in Developing Countries, vols. 2, 3, and 4 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989). 2. Numerous attempts have been made to codify and quantify the existence of democracy across political systems. The best known is probably Freedom House's Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, published since 1973 by Greenwood Press and since 1988 by University Press of America. Also see Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide (New York: Facts on File, 1986). 3. The definition most commonly used by American social scientists is that of Joseph Schumpeter: "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), 269. We accept certain aspects of the classical procedural approach to modern democracy, but differ primarily in our emphasis on the accountability of rulers to citizens and' the relevance of mechanisms of ' competition other than elections. 4. Not only dq some countries practice a stable fonn of democracy without a fonnal constitution (e.g., Great Britain and Israel), but even more countries have constitutions and